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European Central Bank Working Paper Series  45Abstract
This paper investigates the role of credit market size as a determinant of business
cycle ￿ uctuations. First, using OECD data I document that credit market depth
mitigates the impact of variations in productivity to output volatility. Then, I use a
business cycle model with borrowing limits a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to replicate
this empirical regularity. The relative price of capital and the reallocation of capital
are the key variables in explaining the relation between credit market size and output
volatility. The model matches resonably well the reduction in productivity-driven
output volatility implied by the established size of the credit market observed in OECD
data.
Keywords: credit frictions, reallocation of capital, asset prices.
JEL codes:E21-E22- E44- G20
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Studying the determinants of business cycle ￿ uctuations is crucial for understanding
the dynamics of modern economies. The aim of this paper is to examine how the degree
of credit market development is related to business cycle ￿ uctuations in industrialized
countries. The paper presents some empirical facts and a model economy whose aim is to
replicate the relation between credit market size and the volatility of output.
First, OECD data are used to show that a negative and signi￿cant relation exists
between credit market size ￿as a proxy for the degree of credit market depth ￿and the
propagation to output of variation in productivity. Credit market size substantially reduces
the volatility of output driven by variations in productivity. Second, I present a model
economy in which di⁄erent degrees of credit market development, ceteris paribus, a⁄ect the
sensitivity of output to productivity shocks and thus its volatility over the business cycle. I
use a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with collateral constraints a la Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) in which higher liquidation costs characterizes less developed credit
systems. Existing literature dealing with credit markets has shown that credit frictions
may be a powerful transmission mechanism that propagates and ampli￿es shocks. This
paper demonstrates that in a model with collateral constraints, movements in the relative
price of capital and thus the reallocation of capital, substantially a⁄ect the sensitivity
of output to shocks. In accordance with the empirical ￿ndings, the model asserts that
the propagation of variations in productivity to output is greater in economies with tighter
credit markets. The reduction in productivity-driven output volatility implied by the model
is closely related to the data.
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As a result of macroeconomic, political and legal factors, credit markets signi￿cantly di⁄er
among OECD countries1. At the same time the volatility of the cyclical component of
output shows a noticeable degree of variation across countries and time (Figure 1.a). Table
1 reports that credit market size is negatively and signi￿cantly correlated with the volatil-
ity of output, consumption, investment, investment in residential properties and housing
prices2. Preliminary analysis on OECD data, indicating that smoother ￿ uctuations are as-
sociated with greater sizes of the credit market, provide a reasonable ground to investigate
the relation between credit market development and business cycle ￿ uctuations in indus-
trialized countries. The analysis is conducted in three steps. First, OECD data are used
to document the relation between the degree of credit market development and macroeco-
nomic ￿ uctuations. Speci￿cally, a greater size of the credit market, as a proxy for credit
market depth, reduces the propagation of variations in productivity to output volatility.
Second, I develop a two-sector business cycle model that links the degree of credit market
development to the sensitivity of output to productivity shocks, and thus its volatility over
the business cycle. Last, I compare the predictions of the model with the empirical ￿nd-
ings. The model predicts a reduction in productivity-driven output volatility of about 20%
that closely corresponds to the data evidence. Despite the stylized nature of the model, it
mimics the data reasonably well both qualitatively and quantitatively.
Model. The model is based on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). To generate a reason for
the existence of credit ￿ ows, two types of agents are assumed, both of whom produce and
consume the same type of goods using a physical asset. They di⁄er in terms of discount
factors, and consequently, impatient agents become borrowers. Credit constraints arise
because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay. Thus, physical assets, are used not only
as factors of production but also as loan collateral. My setup di⁄ers from Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) framework, in that I use more standard assumptions as to preferences and
1See e.g. La Porta, Lopes-de Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997) and Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and
Shleifer(2006),
2See also ￿gures 1.a and 1.b. Correlations are computed for quarterly variables averaged over rolling
three-year periods during the 1983-2004 a sample of 20 OECD countries.Volatility is measured as the
standard deviation of the log detrended real variables. Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter are used to remove the
estimated trend of the series.
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perfectly predicted by the agents. To be able to investigate the behavior of economies that
di⁄er in terms of access to credit ￿nancing, I allow for the existence of liquidation costs in
modeling the collateral constraint4.
According to the Schumpeterian view, aggregate shocks generate an inter-￿rm real-
location of resources, and evidence of this is well established as pertains to job ￿ ows.
Rampini and Eisfeldt (2005) have recently demonstrated the relevance of physical capital
reallocation over the business cycle5. In fact, in the USA the amount of capital realloca-
tion represents approximately one quarter of total investment, and that depending on how
capital reallocation is measured, between 1.4 and 5.5 of the capital stock turns over each
year. Furthermore, the reallocation of existing productive assets among ￿rms (sales and
acquisitions of property, plant, and equipment) is procyclical.
The model presented in this paper generates a negative relationship between the degree
of credit market development and output volatility giving a primary role to variations in
relative prices and thus the reallocation of capital across ￿rms. When the economy is
hit by a positive neutral productivity shock agents increase their capital expenditure, the
relative price of capital rises and existing capital is thus reallocated to the production of
the capital good. In economies with a greater access to the credit market, the productivity
gap between the two groups of agents is smaller. Thus, following a productivity shock,
less capital is redistributed to the more productive agents. The sensitivity of asset prices
to the shock is reduced and consequently less capital is reallocated to the capital good
production. As a result total production reacts by less to the shock. The magnitude of the
e⁄ect of credit market size on the reduction in the volatility of output induced by variations
3Kiyotaki and Moore assume that the agents are risk neutral and apart from using di⁄erent discount
factors, they also di⁄er in their production technology. In my model, both groups of agents have a concave
utility function and are generally identical, except that they have di⁄erent subjective discount factors.
4As in Aghion et al. (2005) collateral requirements serve as a proxy for the degree of credit market
development. Tighter collateral constraints result in a smaller size of the credit market and thus, characterize
economies with a less-developed credit market.
5See also Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Andreade, Mitchell, and Sta⁄ord (2001), Schoar (2002),
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). A few papers also examine the behavior of capital reallocation from a
microeconomic point of view. Among the main results are that capital ￿ ows from less productive to more
productive ￿rms (Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)) and that gains derived from reallocation appear larger
when productivity di⁄erences are greater (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes(1990)).
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in productivity is in accordance with the empirical ￿ndings.This results contribute signi￿cantly to the debate concerning the ampli￿cation role of
collateral constraints. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) show that adopting standard assump-
tions about preferences and technologies makes Kiyotaki and Moore￿ s model unable to
generate persistent or ampli￿ed shocks. Thus, their results call into question the quanti-
tative relevance of credit frictions as a transmission mechanism. I document that in the
model presented here, the magnitude of ampli￿cation is related to the degree of credit ra-
tioning. The results of Cordoba and Ripoll hold only for economies with the least possible
degree of credit rationing allowed by the model.
Layout. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses some empirical evidence.
Section 3 presents the model, while section 4 discusses the solution method and calibra-
tion. Section 5 shows the steady-state implications of di⁄erent degrees of credit rationing.
Section 6 presents the dynamics of the model, and Section7 the relationship between credit
market size and business cycle volatility. Section 8 investigates the importance of having
two sectors of production in the model by comparing the results in terms of volatility with
the one sector model version. Section 9 presents the conclusions of the study.
2 Related Literature and Empirical Facts
Literature. This paper is related to the large literature about ￿nancial frictions and
business cycle. Most of the theoretical research focuses on credit frictions as a trans-
mission mechanism that propagates and ampli￿es shocks. Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
Calstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) among others, study
the relevance of ￿nancial factors on ￿rm￿ s investment decisions, emphasizing the role of
agency-costs. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) show that if debt needs to be
fully secured by collateral, small shocks can have large and persistent e⁄ects on economic
activity. Iacoviello (2005) documents the relevance of housing prices and collateralized
debt for the transmission and ampli￿cation of shocks. These papers have been very in￿ u-
ential and a big strand of the literature has used collateral constraints as an ampli￿cation
mechanism of shocks. Nevertheless, only few papers have analyzed the role of the degree
of credit market development on business cycle ￿ uctuations. Examining access to the in-
8
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open economies at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development are more vulnerable to
shocks. Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2005) document that the degree of
credit market development makes growth less sensitive to commodity price shocks.
Recent papers on the U.S. Great moderation also provide some insights on the relation
between ￿nancial factors and business cycle ￿ uctuations. Justiniano and Primiceri (2006)
report that the decline in the volatility of shocks speci￿c to the equilibrium condition of
investment accounts for most of the decline in the macro volatility. Further more they
also document evidence of the fact that the reduction in the volatility of the relative price
of investment corresponds remarkably well with the timing of the ￿nancial deregulation.
Campell and Hercowitz (2005) demonstrate that indeed the ￿nancial reforms of the mort-
gage market that took place in the early 1980s., coincided with a decline in the volatility of
output, consumption, and hours worked. Similarly, Guerron (2007) shows that the great
moderation can be partially attributed to the decreased portfolio adjustment costs result-
ing by the same process of ￿nancial deregulation. Jermann and Quadrini (2005) attribute
a primary role to a more ￿ exible use of equity ￿nancing in accounting for a substantial
reduction in macroeconomic volatility.
This paper is in the same spirit of Aghion et al. (2003) and Aghion et al. (2005), but it
focuses on the role of credit market depth in the transmission of variations in productivity
to the volatility of output in industrialized countries. In doing so, I do not limit the
analysis to the comparison of two di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial development ￿i.e. calibrated
pre- and post-Great-Moderation ￿but I explore the theoretical nexus by analysing a full
range of levels of development in the domestic credit market including all possible state of
development across OECD countries in the last two decades.
Cross-country analysis also suggest a link between credit market development and eco-
nomic ￿ uctuation. Using large samples of countries, most of which developing countries,
Beck et al. (2000), Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002) and Da Silva (2002) demonstrate that
well-developed credit markets induce smoother output ￿ uctuations. More recent papers
document the e⁄ects of bank ￿nancing and ￿nancial deregulation on the volatility of out-
put growth, risk sharing and e¢ ciency. Among others, Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2006),
Larrain (2006) and Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess (2006) using state-level US data suggest a
9
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investments.
Empirical Evidence. In the following I test the e⁄ects of the degree of credit market
development on output volatility in OECD countries. In particular I examine the e⁄ect
of credit market size on the propagation of variation in productivity to output. Following
Aghion et al (2005), I measure credit market depth, Crediti;t; by the size of the credit
market, i.e. the credit extended to the domestic private sector by banks and other ￿nancial
institutions as a share of GDP.
To test for causality I estimate a panel speci￿cation:
￿Y
i;t = ￿i + ￿t + ￿1Crediti;t + ￿2Xcontrol
i;t + ui;t (1)
where the time index refers to non-overlapping three-year periods, ￿Y
i;t is the standard
deviation of the business cycle component of GDP in real terms for country i, ￿i is a
country-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿t is a time-speci￿c e⁄ect, and ui;t is the variability in output not
explained by the regressors. All the variables refer to non-overlapping three-year periods.
The dataset includes quarterly time-series data from 1983 to 2004 for 20 OECD economies6.
The volatility of the cyclical component of the Solow residuals is often used as a proxy for
technology shocks. As in Backus et al.(1992), Karras and Song (1996), and Ferreira da
Silva (2002), I de￿ne this as the change in the log of real GDP minus 1-￿ times the change
in the log of employment. To reduce concerns about potentially omitted variables I include
country ￿xed-e⁄ects. I also allow for time ￿xed e⁄ects to capture time trends a⁄ecting
all countries in the sample. However, I also control for other potential determinants of
business cycle ￿ uctuations, such as the variability of the short-term interest rate, terms
of trade and consumption prices. Since I am interested in the volatility of the cyclical
component of GDP, Solow residuals, and interest rates, the HP ￿lter method is used.
Table 2 summarizes the results. As in Aghion et al. (2005) credit market size does
not appear to be directly related to output volatility. However, private credit mitigates
the impact of variations in productivity to output. Although the ￿xed-e⁄ect speci￿cation
reduces concern about potentially omitted variables, in column 2 and 3 I introduce into the
6All OECD data used are obtained from the OECD database, while the data regarding private credit
come from the IFS.
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larger credit market does dampen the propagation of Solow residual volatility to output of
about 13-18% depending on the control variables introduced in the regression. In table 2, I
measure credit market size as a moving average over the three years. However, table 3 show
that the result is robust independently of how credit market size is measured. In column
2, I measure credit market size as the beginning of the period value to emphasize how the
established credit-to-GDP ratio a⁄ects volatility in the following period. I also check the
robustness of the relation, using the average over the all period sample, as a measure of
credit market development that varies only in the cross-section and not over time (column
3). In all speci￿cation the interaction between credit market size and the standard deviation
of Solow residuals has a negative and signi￿cant sign. Thus, across OECD countries, in the
last twenty years, credit market size reduces the volatility of output induced by variations
in productivity.
3 The Model
Consider a stochastic discrete-time economy populated by two types of households that
trade two kinds of goods, a durable asset and a non-durable commodity. The durable asset,
k, is reproducible and depreciates at the rate of ￿. The commodity good, c, is produced
using the durable asset and cannot be stored. At time t there are two competitive markets
in the economy: the asset market in which one unit of the durable asset can be exchanged
for qt units of the consumption good, and the credit market. I assume a continuum of ex
ante heterogeneous households of unit mass n1, patient entrepreneurs (denoted by 1), and
n2, impatient entrepreneurs (denoted by 2). To impose the existence of credit ￿ ows in this
economy, I assume that the ex ante heterogeneity is based on di⁄erent subjective discount
factors.








with ￿1 > ￿2 s.t. a budget constraint
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bit+1 ￿ ￿Et [qt+1kit] (3)
Real production is given by
Fit = yit + qthit
where yit represents the technology for producing consumption goods and hit is the pro-















it￿1 ￿j = c;h ￿being the stock of capital used as an input of production in the
two sectors. Unlike Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), I assume that agents have access to the
same concave production technology7. Kiyotaki and Moore take the two groups of agents
to represent two di⁄erent sectors of the economy; on the contrary, I assume technology






2). Moreover, I also allow
for reproducible capital and assume that each agent is able to produce both consumption
and investment goods8. For simplicity, I will assume that both types of production are
identical9. However, I do follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in assuming that the technology
is speci￿c to each producer and that only the household that initiated a particular type
of production has the skills necessary to complete it. Thus, if agent i decides not to put
e⁄ort into production between t and t + 1, there would be no production outcome at t +
1, but only the asset kit. The agents cannot precommit to produce; moreover, they are free
to walk away from the production and debt contracts between t and t + 1. This results
in a default problem that prompts creditors to protect themselves by collateralizing the
household￿ s assets. Creditors know that if the household abandons its production and debt
obligations, they will still get his asset. However, I assume that the lenders can repossess the
borrower￿ s assets only after paying a proportional transaction cost, [(1￿￿)Etqt+1kit]. Thus,
7See Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) for a discussion of how di⁄erent assumptions about production technol-
ogy a⁄ect the impact of technology shocks in the modeled economy.
8In this way I avoid creating a rental market for capital, and make the model directly comparable to
those of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004).
9The assumption of decreasing returns in the production of invetment goods is equivalent to assume
convex adjustment costs for investments.
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the next period cannot exceed the expected value of next period assets bit ￿ ￿Et [qt+1kit];
where ￿ < 1; and (1￿￿) represents the cost lenders must pay to repossess the asset. As in
Aghion, Baccheta, and Banerjee (2003) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2004), limiting the
borrowing to a fraction of the expected liquidation value of the capital takes into account
di⁄erent degrees of credit market development. In fact, a high ￿ represents a lower degree
of credit rationing and thus a more developed ￿nancial sector while a low ￿ represents an
underdeveloped system10. As I will show below, the model displays a one to one mapping
between ￿ and the size of the credit market.
3.1 Agents ￿optimal choices
Step 1: Optimal allocation of capital
I divide the agents￿problem into two steps. First, in any given period each agent






















The relative price of capital equals the ratio of the marginal productivity of capital in
the two sectors. It is possible to express the amount of capital allocated to each type of
production as a fraction of the total capital owned by each agent, as follows:
kc










: Thus, the allocation of existing capital between the two productions
depends on the current relative price of capital. The total production of each individual
can be expressed as
Fit = k￿
it￿1Zt [￿￿ + qt (1 ￿ ￿)
￿] (7)
10In an economy in which the legal system is very e¢ cient the commitment problem vanishes and the
borrowing constraint is not necessary any more.
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s.t. the budget constraint
cit + qt(kit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kit￿1) = k￿





and the borrowing constraint
bit+1 ￿ ￿Et [qt+1kit]















where Fki;t+1 is the marginal product of capital.
The ￿rst equation relates the marginal bene￿t of borrowing to its marginal cost, while





qt+1 (1 ￿ ￿)
i
,
is greater than or equal to the expected discounted marginal product of capital.
In this framework, impatient agents borrow up to the maximum possible amount in a
neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. In fact, if we consider the Euler equation
for the impatient household in the steady state,
￿2 = (￿1 ￿ ￿2)Uc2 > 0 (10)
￿2t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint. Thus, if the
economy ￿ uctuates around the deterministic steady state, the borrowing constraint holds
with equality
b2;t = ￿Et [qt+1k2t] (11)
and
k2t =
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represents the di⁄erence between the price of
capital and the amount this agent can borrow against a unit of capital, i.e., the down
payment required to buy a unit of capital. Thus, in the neighborhood of the steady state




￿ ￿2;t = ￿iEtUci;t+1 (9.a)
Moreover, borrowers internalize the e⁄ects of their capital stock on their ￿nancial con-
straints. Thus, the marginal bene￿t of holding one unit of capital is given not only by its














Collateral constraints alter the future revenue from an additional unit of capital for the
borrowers. Holding an extra unit of capital relaxes the credit constraint and thus increases
their shadow price of capital. Thus, this additional return encourages borrowers to accu-
mulate capital even though they discount the revenues more heavily that lenders. As long
as the marginal product of capital di⁄ers from its market price, borrowers have an incentive
to change capital stock11. In contrast, patient households are creditors in the neighborhood
of the steady state. Thus, the lender￿ s capital decision is determined by the point at which











Agents￿capital stock evolves according to
kit = (1 ￿ ￿)kit￿1 + hit (13)
The total stock of capital kt is given by
kt = k1t + k2t (14)
The following conditions also hold
yt = y1t + y2t = c1t + c2t (15)
11The price of capital is higher than the frictionless marginal tobin￿ s q for the borrowers.
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b1t = ￿b2t (16)4 Model Solution
4.1 Benchmark parameter values
I calibrate the model at quarterly intervals, setting the patient households￿discount factor
to 0.99, such that the average annual rate of return is approximately 4%;while the impatient







and set ’ to equal 2.2. The productivity parameter, ￿ is 0.36, as in the tradition of the
real business cycle literature13. The capital depreciation rate equals 0.03. The baseline
choice for the fraction of borrowing-constrained population is set to 50. The parameter
representing the degree of credit rationing, ￿, is in the [0,1] range. Finally, I calibrate
the technology shocks according to standard values in the real business cycle literature14.
Table 4 summarizes the parameter values.
4.2 Dynamics
The agents￿optimal choices of borrowing and capital, together with the equilibrium condi-
tions, represent a non-linear dynamic stochastic system of equations. Since the equations
are assumed to be well-behaved functions, the solution of the system is found by using stan-
dard local approximation techniques. All the methods commonly used for such systems
rely on the use of log-linear approximations around the steady state to obtain a solvable
stochastic system of di⁄erence equations.
By ￿nding a solution, I mean to express all variables as linear functions of a vector of
variables, both endogenous state, xt￿1, and exogenous state, zt, variables, i.e., I am seeking
the recursive equilibrium law of motion:
xt = Pxt￿1 + Qzt
12Lawrance (1991) estimates that the discount factors of poor households are in the 0.95 to 0.98 range,
while according to Carroll and Samwick (1997), the empirical distribution of discount factors lies in the
0.91 to 0.99 interval.
13See Cooley and Prescott (1995) or Prescott (1986).
14For technology shock, see chapter 1 in Cooley and Prescott (1995) or Prescott 1986.
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yt = Rxt￿1 + Szt
where yt is the vector of endogenous (or jump) variables.To solve for the recursive law of motion, I need to ￿nd the matrices P;Q;R;andS,
so that the equilibrium described by these rules is stable. I solve this system using the
undetermined coe¢ cients method of, for example, McCallum (1983), King, Plosser, and
Rebelo (1987), Campbell (1994), and Uhlig (1995).15.
5 Credit Market Size and the Deterministic Steady State
Now, I analyze how the degree of credit rationing, ￿, a⁄ects the deterministic steady state
of the model. Since total output is maximized when the marginal productivity of the
two groups is identical, I examine how the allocation of capital between the two groups
varies with ￿. Using households￿optimal choice of capital ￿equations (10.a) and (10.b) ￿








1 ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(￿1 ￿ ￿2)




The steady-state allocation of capital depends on the subjective discount factors, ￿1and
￿2, the fraction of the two groups of agents, n, the depreciation rate, ￿, and the degree of
credit market development, ￿. Thus, the allocation under credit constraints reduces the
level of capital held by the borrowers. In fact, as long as ￿ < 1
￿1 = 1:0101; equation (19)
implies a di⁄erence in the marginal productivity of the two groups: Figure 2a shows the
steady-state productivity gap with respect to ￿. Less credit rationing, allowing for a more
e¢ cient allocation of capital between the two groups, implies a smaller productivity gap,
and thus smaller losses in terms of total production. In the presence of credit frictions it is
not possible to reach the e¢ cient equilibrium, but a higher ￿ does reduce the output loss.
Figure 2b shows the deterministic steady-state values of the model￿ s variables with
respect to the degree of credit market development, ￿. Increased access to the credit market
implies credit expansion, bss, and thus a rise in the level of investment by borrowers, k2ss.
With more capital allocated to the most productive group of agents, there is an increase
15See Uhlig (1995), A Toolkit for Analyzing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models Easily, for a description
of the solution method.
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Hence, the amount of total capital, Kss, and consumption, Css, are higher as well16. In the
steady state, asset price depends on the marginal productivity of capital and increases with
￿17. The model delivers also a mapping between the ratio of private credit to total output
and ￿ = b2
qk2: Figure 2.c shows that by varying ￿ between zero and unity, it is possible to
reproduce the same private credit-to-GDP as found in the data and thus, directly relate
the theoretical results to the empirical ￿ndings.
6 Model Dynamics
I now consider the response of the model economy to a productivity shock. I assume that
the economy is at the steady-state level at time zero and then is hit by an unexpected 1%
increase in aggregate productivity. I assume that the productivity shock follows an AR(1)
process given by
ln(Zt) = ￿Z ln(Zt￿1) + "Zt; "Zt viid N(0;￿￿) (19)
Figure 3.a shows the response of total aggregate output to the productivity shock. As we
see, after a 1% increase in aggregate productivity, total output increases by approximately
1.2% in the ￿rst period and further more in the second. In what follows I will show that
variations in the relative price of capital generated by the redistribution of capital between
the two groups of agents, strongly contribute to the ampli￿cation of the shock. In fact,
variation in qt determine the reallocation of existing capital between di⁄erent sectors of
production (reallocation of capital in terms of use) and thus generate ampli￿cation of the
shock already in the period in which the shock hits the economy.
As a response to a neutral technology shock, the model displays co-movement between
the consumption and capital good production. However, the production of the capital good
16Up to a certain value of ￿, borrowers￿consumption increases. This is due to both a credit channel e⁄ect
and a wealth e⁄ect. Agents bene￿t from both greater access to debt ￿nancing and the increasing value of
their assets. However, as expected, borrowers￿steady-state consumption decreases as ￿ approaches unity.
In an environment with relaxed credit restrictions, impatient agents prefer to consume more today than in
the future, thus reducing the steady-state consumption level.






Fk2 is always less than unity for any
value of ￿ < 1: Thus, the model can never the equivalent to the standard one-sector real business cycle
model with a one-to-one trasformation rate between consumption and capital.
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reacts much less markedly (Figure 3.b). As a positive shock hits the economy, borrowers
￿limited in their capital holding before the occurrence of the shock by the existence of
borrowing constraints ￿increase their demand for productive assets. Thus the user cost of
holding capital rises as shown in Figure 3.b. The increase in the relative price of capital
implies a more pro￿table use of the input of production in the capital good sector and
thus a reallocation of capital towards this production. This allows for the agents to more
easily smooth the e⁄ect of the shock through investment. The change of use of the existing
productive asset a⁄ects the impact of the shock on the two productions. As indicated by
￿; capital is reallocated towards the production of investment goods in coincidence of the




This explains the stronger e⁄ect of the shock on the production of the capital good. With
asset prices increasing and the production of investment goods strongly reacting to the
shock, the response of aggregate real output to a productivity shock is greatly ampli￿ed.
The rise in borrowers￿current investment expenditures propagates the positive e⁄ect of the
shock to their production over time. Since the marginal productivity of capital is higher
for borrowers, this also generates a second period ampli￿cation on aggregate production19.
Figure 3b also shows that the rise in asset prices coupled with the increase in borrowers￿
capital expenditure, implies a credit boom20. For the patient agents to be willing to increase
the amount of funds o⁄ered for borrowing, the interest rate must increase in the ￿rst period.
Figure 3.c presents the dynamics of the two groups￿production in more detail. Since
in the ￿rst period the agents decide to reallocate their own capital towards the production
of capital goods, all agents￿productions behave identically. In the second period, given
the redistribution of capital towards patient agents, the productions speci￿c to constrained
18Variables are in log devation from their steady state values.
19In fact, when the capital used by the most productive agents increases ￿ as well as their share of
production (F2;t=Ft) ￿the e⁄ect of the shock is ampli￿ed even more.
20
^ bt+1 = ^ qt+1 + ^ kt+1
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cation. In contrast, the ampli￿cation on lenders￿productions is minimal. The reallocation
of capital between the two sectors still a⁄ects the production behavior of both groups in
the second period. However, what generates di⁄erences in the impact of the shock is the
fact that the capital held by constrained agents increases substantially. Thus, while in the
￿rst period the only source of ampli￿cation is the reallocation of capital in terms of use, in
the second period both sectorial and ownership reallocation take place.
6.1 Credit Market Size and Business Cycle
In what follows, I consider how the sensitivity of output to productivity shocks is a⁄ected
by ￿ and consequently the size of the credit market. Figure 4.a, shows the initial impact
of productivity shocks ￿ i.e., the intensity of reaction for any given value of ￿. As a
result, more-developed credit markets display reduced ampli￿cation of productivity shocks
on output21. Looking at the decomposition of output, a larger credit market magni￿es
the reaction of consumption goods production while weakening the response of investment
goods production. The di⁄erence between the reactions of the two sectors is explained by
the dynamics of the relative price of capital and thus the capital reallocation between the
two sector. As shown in Figure 4.b (top panel), reducing credit market frictions lowers the
sensitivity of asset prices to productivity shocks and consistently reduces the magnitude
of capital reallocation. Given that in economies with a lower degree of credit rationing the
productivity gap between lenders and borrowers is smaller, less capital is redistributed to
the borrowers to ￿ll the gap. Thus, borrowers￿demand for capital rises by less reducing the
increase in the relative price of capital. So, it becomes less pro￿table to reallocate capital
to the production of investment goods. In economies with greater access to credit, ceteris
paribus, less capital (as collateral) is needed to be able to borrow the same amount, so less
capital is reallocated to the production of investment goods. This e⁄ect contributes to the
same shock having a weaker impact on total aggregate production. Since the decreased
reaction of the capital production sector is greater than the ampli￿cation of the shock in
the consumption goods production, a larger credit market dampens the propagation of
21This ￿nding is in accordance with Calstrom and Fuerst￿ s (1997) results of a stronger impact of neutral
technology shocks on output when a lower value or the monitoring cost in the ￿nancial contract is assumed.
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productivity shocks to output.Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), assuming ￿ = 1 in the standard Kiyotaki and Moore
setup, show that collateral constraints are unable to generate ampli￿cation of productivity
shocks. This ￿nding still holds in the model presented here. However, if we allow for
di⁄erent degrees of credit market development the magnitude of the initial ampli￿cation
impact varies with the credit market size. Thus, the ampli￿cation of productivity shocks
to output is greater in economies with tighter collateral constraints. Once we allow for ￿
to be lower than unity, the ampli￿cation generated in the model is no longer negligible.
7 Credit market size and output volatility: comparing model
predictions with the data
Finally, I examine the relationship between the volatility of the cyclical component of out-
put and the size of the credit market delivered by the model. The aim is to document that
the model can reproduce the fact that credit market size reduces the volatility of output
induced by variations in productivity by the same magnitude as observed across time and
countries. I simulate the model economy for three di⁄erent values of ￿;f0:2;0:5;0:9g: The
productivity shock follows an AR(1) process, i.e., ln(Zt) = ￿Z ln(Zt￿1) + "Zt; "Zt viid
N(0;￿￿): The standard deviation of the productivity process is calibrated to match the
average standard deviation of the cyclical component of the Solow residual for all sampled
countries during the 1983:1-2004:4 period. Thus, I set the standard deviation of the pro-
ductivity equal to the average value (￿z = 0.9875, ￿z = 0), and generate arti￿cial series for
asset prices, output, and investment and consumption goods, for any given credit market
size. Table 5 reports the results. The volatility of output implied by ￿=0.5 is 3% lower than
the volatility obtained with ￿=0.2. A more substantial di⁄erence occurs when we compare
output volatility for higher values of ￿. Output is 17% less volatile when ￿=0.9 than when
￿=0.5. Since ￿ determines the steady state credit market size of the model, estimations
in table 3 column 2, in which I measure credit size as the beginning of the period value,
are directly comparable with the results of the model. According to the estimations a well
developed credit market reduces the volatility of output due to variations in productivity
of about 18%. The size of the credit market in the sample corresponds to values of ￿ in
21
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about 17% is in accordance with the empirical estimates. Despite its stylized nature, the
model is quite successful in matching the data.
For completeness, I simulate the model for 1000 values of ￿ in the [0,1] range. The
number of simulated series for the calculation of moments is 5000 for any given ￿. Figure
5 shows that, the standard deviation of total output decreases with the size of the credit
market. The model display also a lower volatility of asset prices22 (see Figure 5, middle
panel). The volatility of investment relative to consumption goods decreases with the
degree of credit friction as well. The impact of variations in productivity to output volatility
is reduced by about 26% for ￿ between 0.0001 and unity and around 20% for ￿ between
0.5 and unity. In both the model and the data there is a clear evidence that well developed
credit markets induce smoother business cycle ￿ uctuations. The reduction in productivity-
driven output volatility implied by the established size of the credit market in the model
is of the same magnitude as documented by the empirical ￿ndings reported in section 2.
Thus, the model mimics the data very closely both qualitatively and quantitatively.
8 One vs Two- Sector Model: Ampli￿cation and Volatility
In what follows I show that the two-sector model displays greater ampli￿cation and per-
sistence of productivity shocks than the standard Kiyotaki and Moore model. Figure 6.a
compares the reaction of total aggregate production in the present model with the response
in the one-sector model. In the one-sector version of the model aggregate capital is ￿xed
in supply and only one consumption good is produced. The only source of ampli￿cation
is the redistribution of capital in favor of the borrowers. Thus, there is ampli￿cation of
the shock only in the second period. In contrast, in the two-sector model, even in the ￿rst
period the reallocation of capital towards investment goods production and the increase in
the price of these goods already generated signi￿cant ampli￿cation. In the second period
still greater ampli￿cation is generated, not only by this mechanism, but also by the redis-
22This result is in accordance with the ￿ndings of Justiniano and Primiceri (2005). In fact, they demon-
strate that the volatility of the relative price of investment in terms of consumption goods decreased following
￿nancial deregulation in the U.S. in the early 1980s. Moreover, the decline in the volatility of the relative
price of investment was simultaneous with the timing of the ￿Great Moderation.￿
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of the model generates more ampli￿cation and persistence of productivity shocks than does
the standard Kiyotaki and Moore setup.
Figure 6.b shows how the size of the credit market a⁄ects the transmission of pro-
ductivity shocks in the standard one-sector model. An inverted U-shaped relationship is
delivered by the model. As pointed out by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), in the one-sector
model, the elasticity of total output to technology shocks can be written as follows23:







The ￿rst term is the productivity gap between constrained and unconstrained agents, ￿
is the share of collateral in production,
y2
y is the production share of constrained agents, and
￿k2z is the redistribution of capital. In the one-sector model, the fraction of total output
produced by constrained agents increases with increasing values of ￿ because more capital
is held by the constrained population. However, for the same reason, the productivity gap
decreases with ￿. Thus, the second impact of productivity shocks on total output depends
on these two opposing forces24. As a result, the degree of credit market development a⁄ects
the reaction of output to productivity shocks di⁄erently in the two models. Also in the
1-sector model, the magnitude of the initial ampli￿cation impact varies with credit market
size. Once we allow for ￿ to be lower than unity, the ampli￿cation generated in the model
is no longer negligible25. However, the ampli￿cation of productivity shocks to output is
greater in economies at an intermediate level of credit market development.
Figure 6.c compare the relationship between output volatility and degree of credit
market development predicted by the two-sector and one-sector framework. Only the two-
sector model displays a negative relation between the implied standard deviation of output
and the assumed credit market size at the beginning of the period.
23Since the initial impact of the shock would always be equal to the shock itself, we are now looking at
the second-period e⁄ect of the shock.
24Regardless as to the shape of the capital reaction to technology shocks, the relationship between ￿ and
the second impact of zt on yt assumes an inverted U shape; this is, of course, more pronounced when ￿k2z
is not monotonic.
25For further discussion on the ampli￿cation role of collateral constraints refer to Mendicino (2006).
23
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 743
March 200724
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 743 
March 2007
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I revisit the relationship between the degree of credit market development
and business cycle volatility. I present some evidence concerning the fact that industri-
alized countries with better-developed credit markets experience smoother business cycle
￿ uctuations. I develop a two-sector business cycle model, built on that of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), to investigate the contribution of credit market development to the decrease
in macroeconomic volatility. To explain the behavior of economies that di⁄er in terms
of access to credit ￿nancing, I also allow for the existence of liquidation costs in model-
ing the collateral constraint. Relying on a business cycle model that takes into account
di⁄erent degrees of credit frictions, I demonstrate that tighter credit markets greatly am-
plify the propagation to output of variations in productivity. As a result, the reduction in
productivity-driven output volatility implied by the model is closely related to the data.
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Table 1: Correlation with Credit Market Size
Countries 20, Period 1983-2004
￿(y) ￿(c) ￿(I) ￿(Ih) ￿(q)
credit -0.2992** -0.2089** -0.2498** -0.2575** -0.1052*
￿(y),￿(c),￿(I), ￿(ih), standard deviation of respectively detrended log real output,
consumption, investment andinvestment in residential properties. ￿(q) standard
deviation of detrended log housing prices, credit stands for credit to the private
sector as a share of gdp, is the ratio during the same period. Three years avagages
Data on 20 OECD countries. Source: OECD. 1 and 5 per cent signi￿cant coe¢ cients
respectively one and two stars.32
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R2 0.570027 0.589365 0.583302
Countries 20 20 20
obs 140 140 140
Period 1983-04 1983-04 1983-04
Dependent Variable, ￿(y), standard deviation of detrended log real output.
Credit is the credit market size averaged over the 3 year period.
Col 2. controls: volatility of interest rate, terms of trade, cpi
Col 3. controls: property rights, volatility of interest rate, terms of trade, cpi
Panel regressions based on 3-year non-overlapping averages. Country and
time-￿xed e⁄ects included. White-type robust standard errors in parenthesis,
5 and 10 per cent signi￿cant coe¢ cients respectively in bold and italics




















R2 0.583302 0.595468 0.586303
Countries 20 20 20
obs 140 140 140
Period 1983-04 1983-04 1983-04
Dependent Variable, ￿(y), standard deviation of detrended log real output.
Col. 1: Credit is the credit market size averaged over the 3 year period.
Col. 2: Credit is the credit market size at the beginning of the period
Col. 3: Credit is the credit market size averaged over the all period
Controls: property rights, volatility of interest rate, terms of trade, cpi. Panel
based on 3-year non-overlapping averages. Country and time-￿xed e⁄ects included.
White-type robust standard errors in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent signi￿cant
coe¢ cients respectively in bold and italics.33
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Table 4: Parameter Values
preferences shock process
discount rate ￿1 = 0:99 autocorrelation ￿z = 0=0:95
￿2 = 0:95 variance
’ = 2:2
technology
￿ = 0:36 borrowing limit ￿ 2 [0;1]
depreciation rate ￿ = 0:03 population n = 0:5




0.2 1.3462 2.1377 1.4915
0.5 1.3096 1.7570 1.3398
0.9 1.1155 1.2514 1.0374 
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Figure 1a plots the  measure  of credit market development  against the measure of  
business cycle volatility. Output's standard deviations as well as the average of 
private credit as a share of Gdp are calculated on quarterly data for 3 non-
overlapping year 
 






















Asset Prices Volatility and Credit Market Size
credit market size
 
Figure 1b plots  the measure of credit market development against  the  measure of  
business cycle volatility. Asset Prices ' standard deviations as well as the average of  
private credit as a share of Gdp are on quarterly data for 3 non-overlapping year 
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Figure 2.a shows how the steady state productivity gap in total production between the  
two groups of agents varies with respect to γ.  36
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Figure 2.b shows how the steady state values of the model's variables change with respect to  
the degree of credit market development γ. 
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Figure 2.c shows how the steady state values of the size of the credit market change  
with respect to the degree of credit market development γ. 
 























Figure 3.a shows the response of total aggregate output to a 1% increase in productivity.  
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Sensitivity of Total Production to Productivity Shocks
γ
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